Sorry I missed last week's post. I'll be back on normal schedule as soon as possible, I promise.
It's hard to believe that the Arab Spring movement has only been active for a little more than a year. Yet in that relatively short amount of time we've seen perhaps the greatest upheavals and revolutions since the fall of the Soviet Union. Three dictators who likely never imagined a day that they would be deposed have toppled from power. Meanwhile, the people of Syria have tried to add a fourth name to that list: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, Assad has no plans to step down like Mubarak did in Egypt, and it appears that his government was much more prepared for a potential civil war than Ghaddafi's Libya.
From the beginning, people in the media and in politics, as well as a number of Syrian-American organizations, have been calling for more active steps by the US government to help depose Assad. Those voices are louder than ever now, and include such notables as 2008 Republican Presidential candidate John McCain. And certainly, no one in the administration wants to be seen as either weak when dealing with foreign dictators or uncaring about the plight of the oppressed citizens of Syria. Not in an election year, anyway. But on the other hand, jumping into an unpopular military action has a way of bringing about unintended consequences, and if that action is taken too early those consequences may hurt re-election chances. It all comes down to the ruthless calculus of politics.
There are some who are bringing up Libya as an example of NATO intervention that helped bring down a totalitarian regime, but that is a dangerous game for several reasons. First of all, the Libya intervention never had the kind of support among the American people that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had. Second, Ghaddafi had a history of taking violent action against citizens of the United States and our interests, especially during the Cold War (something used by great effect by propagandists for the military action, who could bring up President Ronald Reagan's own military actions against Libya to block protests from the political right). Assad's regime, on the other hand, has engaged in no active campaigns against the United States (although they have been very supportive of groups that have committed acts against our allies, particularly Israel). Going to "kinetic military action" with a country that has never had an official beef against us could establish (or, rather, strengthen) a nasty precedent. Third, Libya has seen a dramatic collapse in social cohesion since the death of Ghaddafi, with a major portion of the country declaring semi-autonomy. We could actually see a civil war brought about because of the fall of Ghaddafi mere months after bringing the previous conflict to a close. Syria lies at the heart of perhaps the most volatile region on the planet, and such destabilization could cascade into other countries or lead to aggressive expansion on the part of Syria's neighbors willing to take advantage of the situation to gain territory and resources. It also must be considered that Syria is a much more powerful foe than Ghaddafi. Whereas the Libyan government stood largely on its own during the civil war, Syria has the explicit backing of Iran and Russia. This extra diplomatic weight has also translated to better technology for the Syrian military, particularly with the Russian-supplied air defense network.
The American military is not excited about the possibility of entering the conflict for several reasons. The first, as stated above, is Syria's air defense grid that would make a bombing campaign like the one that happened in Libya exponentially more complicated, in large part because the key structures for this network are located in or near large population centers and collateral damage would be unavoidable. Also, the Pentagon recognizes that military action in Syria could very easily escalate into a much larger proxy war against Iran or even Russia. Even the option of supplying and training the Syrian opposition is unpopular because of the deep divisions (not to mention divided loyalties and questionable motives) within the opposition movement. Military officials also expressed their disdain for the heated emotional rhetoric about potential intervention that ignores the basic reality on the ground.
Yes, it sucks that Assad is killing so many of his own people, but trying to give him the boot may lead to greater casualties and destruction. For a good analysis of the situation and the possibilities, watch the following segment of GBTV's "Real News": http://www.theblaze.com/stories/house-of-assad-real-news-panel-on-how-going-into-syria-could-exacerbate-the-ongoing-internal-conflict/
Great article as usual!
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